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EARNINGS INFORMATION CONVEYED BY DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
Kulkanya Napompech 
King Mongkut’s Institute of Technology, Ladkrabang, Thailand 
 
ABSTRACT:  It is known that managers know more about their firm’s true financial health than 
shareholders do. Therefore, dividend policy may be of consequence if changes in dividend payments 
are used to convey information that is not otherwise known to the market. This study examines 
whether managers of Thai firms convey information about future earnings through dividend policy. 
It also documents investor reaction to dividend changes. Using financial data during 1994-2008, the 
sample includes 76 firms that omitted dividend payments for the first time, or after paying 
continuously for at least three years.  It also includes 78 firms that paid no dividends for at least 
three years preceding the announcement of the initial dividend. The null hypothesis that average 
earnings changes are zero was tested with Dunnett’s C (Post Hoc) test.  The results provide 
evidence that management signals earnings information content through dividend omission policy. 
Firms that omit dividends have earnings declines prior to the dividend date; the omission firms’ 
earnings recover for one year afterward.  However, there is no support for dividend initiation 
helping to identify firms with superior future profitability.  The results demonstrate that the 
market reaction to dividend omissions and initiations are statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
these earnings changes are anticipated when the dividend is announced. 
KEYWORDS:  dividend policy, dividend initiation, dividend omission, Thailand 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Successful companies earn profits. These 
profits can be invested in rewarding projects, used to 
retire debts, or passed on to stockholders. The profit 
passed on to shareholders is the dividend.  Several 
hypotheses have been advanced to explain why some 
firms pay dividends while others do not (DeAngelo 
et al., 2008).  Finance scholars have proposed 
explanations that all managers use dividends to 
signal firms’ future prospects. This is because 
managers possess information about the earnings 
capacity of the firm superior to what investors have. 
Brav et al. (2005) present evidence based on an 
extensive questionnaire that managers believe 
dividend payouts convey information about the mean 
and/or riskiness of future earnings.  
An unexpected dividend increase conveys 
positive news to investors; an unexpected dividend 
decrease conveys negative information to investors.  
A dividend initiation is a way for managers to 
effectively communicate to investors that 
management forecasts a brighter stream of future 
earnings. Since managers and investors both 
understand that once a dividend policy is initiated, it 
is rare to reduce it later. A dividend initiation also 
implies that management truly believe that earnings 
will be high enough in the future to maintain the 
newly accepted payment level. These claims are 
supported by the evidence of Bulan et al. (2007) who 
reported that dividend initiators tend to be large and 
stable companies with relatively high profitability 
and cash balances.   
On the contrary, a dividend omission is a 
signal that management is forecasting lower future 
earnings. Managers will only reduce or cut dividends 
when the financial health of the firm is declining and 
there is no hope of a rebound in sight. Previous 
studies (De Angelo et  al. , 1992; Brav, et  al., 
2005) document a reluctance of managers to cut 
dividends. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) reported 
on 80 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
that faced prolonged distress (as shown by multiple 
annual losses) during a sample period.  All but two 
of the 80 firms cut their dividends, and 66 (82.5%) 
finally omitted them. DeAngelo et  al. (1992) found 
that managers express strong desires to avoid 
dividend cuts.  They  are willing to sell assets, lay 
off employees, borrow heavily, or even skip positive 
NPV projects before cutting dividends, since 
dividends are of first-order importance to investors 
(De Angelo. et al., 2006).   Therefore, a dividend 
decrease shows that management is pessimistic 
about the firm’s future earnings prospects. Whether 
dividend changes convey information about future 
earnings changes is an issue that continues to attract 
much attention in research. However, there is a lack 
of consensus in the literature regarding the empirical 
validity of the dividend signaling hypothesis.  For 
instance, Brickley (1983), Healy and Palepu (1988), 
Jagannathan et al. (2000), Nissim and Ziv (2001), 
and Koch and Sun (2004) find that there is a 
significant positive association between dividend 
changes and subsequent earnings performance. But 
Watts (1973), DeAngelo et al. (1996), Benartzi et al. 
(1997), Grullon, et al. (2002), and Grullon et al. 
(2005) find no linkage between dividend changes 
and subsequent earnings changes. DeAngelo, et al., 
(1996) found evidence that pleasant dividend actions 
are likely managerial mistakes.  
Some findings provide substantial evidence 
supporting the information content of dividend cuts 
or decreases: they found that an earnings drop prior 
to a dividend reduction (Healey, 1988; Jensen and 
Johnson, 1995; Lie , 2005; Stacescu, 2006). Jensen 
and Johnson (1992), however, creates uncertainty 
relating to the information content of dividend 
decreases convey to the market.  
Dividend changes can affect a stock’s 
market value if investors believe such changes 
convey useful information.  For example, suppose a 
firm has rarely altered its dividend rate, and each 
time the rate was altered, the firm’s earnings later 
altered in the same way.  Investors would then 
interpret future changes in the dividend rate as a 
signal that management believes the firm’s future 
earnings have altered (Emery, et al., 2004).  It has 
been observed that an increase in the dividend is 
often accompanied by an increase in the price of a 
stock, while a dividend cut or reduction generally 
leads to a stock price decline.  
Empirical studies examined how stock 
market investors react to dividend initiation 
announcements, and reported significant positive 
abnormal returns.  On the contrary, dividend cuts or 
omissions are perceived as genuine sadness-yielding, 
statistically significant stock declines (e.g., 
Megginson, W., 1997; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; 
Healy and Palepu, 1988; Michaely, et al., 1995; 
Grullon, et al., 2002). The abnormal returns are 
positively related to the sign and level of dividend 
surprise (e.g., Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Healy and 
Palepu, 1988; Michaely, et al., 1995; Grullon, et al., 
2002).  Asquith and Mullins (1983) investigated the 
effect of dividend initiating policy on stockholders’ 
wealth; they reported a two day excess return of 
3.7%. Healy and Palepu (1988) also examined the 
signaling hypothesis using dividend initiation and 
omission. Consistent with the information content 
hypothesis, they reported a mean abnormal return of 
3.9% for initiation firms and -9.5% for the dividend 
omission firms. Similar to previous findings, 
Grullon, et al., (2002) reported that the average 
abnormal returns to dividend increases and decreases 
were 1.34 % and -3.71% respectively.  DeAngelo et 
al. (2008) documented that on average, dividend 
increases and initiations are met with statistically 
significant, immediate sharp price increases about 
1-3 %, respectively.  In comparison, dividend cuts 
and omissions are typically faced with share price 
declines of approximately 6-10%. 
The aforementioned empirical studies about 
management conveyed earnings information through 
dividend policy, and previous research about how 
markets respond to dividend policy changes, made 
the author want to study these issues in the Thai 
context. This study will contribute by adding to these 
issues with international evidence.  Specifically, the 
objective of this study is to examine the signaling 
hypothesis: earnings information conveyed by 
dividend initiations and omissions among Thai firms, 
and investors’ reactions to dividend announcements. 
 
2. DATA  AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Thai Institutional Framework 
 
Trading on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
officially began on April 30, 1975. The original SET 
consisted of the Main Board and the Market for 
Alternative Investment (MAI).  At the end of 2008, 
560 companies were listed on the SET and 50 
companies were listed on the MAI.  Total market 
capitalization of the SET at the end of 2008 was 
THB 6,095,143.18 million (approximately 34 Thai 
baht (THB) = US$ 1).  Additional information on 
SET can be obtained from the SET web 
site: http://www.set.or.th 
 
2.2 Dividend Omission Sample 
A firm was categorized as an omission firm 
if it does not currently pay dividends but has paid 
dividends in the preceding three years.  Dividend 
omission samples comprise all the Thai Stock 
Exchange firms that are traded on the Main Board 
that omitted dividend payments from 1997-2005.   
In the analysis for this study, earnings information 
and share price data between three years before and 
three years after the omission year were needed. 
Therefore, omission firms that have earnings 
information and share price data  between three 
years before and three years after the omission year 
are selected.   For example, firms that initiated 
dividends in year 2005 must have earnings 
information and share price data for years 
2002-2008. The total omission samples were 76 
(Table 1).  Forty-seven (47) firms (around 62%) of 
the 76 firms omitted dividends in 1997, and ten (10) 
firms (around 13 %) omitted dividends in 1998.  
This is because in 1997, there was a serious financial 
crisis in Thailand.  From 1978 until 2 July 1997, the 
Thai currency (the baht) was pegged at 25 to the US 
dollar.  The baht devalued swiftly and reached its 
lowest point of 56 units to the US dollar in January 
1998. The Thai stock market dropped 75% in 1997. 
 
2.1. Dividend Initiation Sample 
A firm was classified as an initiator if it has 
paid dividends in the current year but not paid any 
for the preceding three years.  Dividend initiation 
samples comprise all Thai Stock Exchange firms that 
are traded on the Main Board that initiated dividend 
payments during 1999-2005. 
In the analysis of this study, earnings and 
share price between three years before and three 
years after the initiation year were needed. Therefore, 
initiation firms that have earnings information and 
share price data between three years before and three 
years after the initiation year were selected.  For 
example, firms that initiated dividends in year 2005 
must have had earnings information and share pried 
data for years 2002-2008. There were 78 initiation 
samples (Table 1).   
Table 1. Dividend Initiations and Omisssions  
Number of Firms 
Year Omissions Year Initiations 
1997 47 1999 1 
1998 10 2000 9 
1999 - 2001 17 
2000 - 2002 19 
2001 1 2003 17 
2002 2 2004 9 
2003 8 2005 6 
2004 2   
2005 6   
 76 Total  78 
 
 
2.2. Test of Signalling Hypothesis: Case of 
Dividend Initiations and Omissions  
To analyze the signaling hypothesis, Healey 
and Palepu’s (1988) earnings patterns of firm 
initiating and omitting dividends for three years 
before the year of event and three years after were 
examined.  To aggregate results across firms, 
earnings changes in these years were expressed as a 
percentage of stock price of the dividend 
announcement year, Pj,t.
 
 The standardized change in 
earnings for firm j in year t, is defined as  
∆E j, t =(E j,t- Ej, t-1)/P
 
j, t 
where, E j, t
 
 are earnings per share for firm j in year t.  
The null hypothesis that average earnings changes 
are zero is tested with Dunnett’s C (Post Hoc) test.   
2.3. Test of Market Reaction to Dividend 
Initiations and Omissions Announcement 
Abnormal returns are estimated for dividend 
initiation and omission firms for the period 10 days 
before to 10 days after announcement. Abnormal 
returns were defined as market-adjusted returns, e.g. 
the difference between firms’ returns and the market 
return.  In Thailand, the Thai Stock Exchange Index, 
commonly known as the SET Index, is the most 
frequently used indicator of market movements.  
This index is used to compute the market adjusted 
returns.  The SET index is a composite index 
calculated from prices of common stocks on the 
market capitalization weighted price index.  This 
compares the current market 
value to shares with the value on the base date of 
April 30, 1975, which was when the SET index was 
established and set at 100 points.  This study uses 
t-test to check whether the abnormal returns are 
statistically different from zero. 
 
3.  ANALYSIS RESULTS 
3.1 Earnings Changes Surrounding Dividend 
Initiations and Omission 
An analysis of past and future levels of 
standardized earnings changes of dividend omitting 
and initiating firms show that the former had 
negative earnings changes in the past three years 
(year -3, year -2, year -1) and current year (year 0).  
The latter had positive earnings changes for the 
previous three years and the current year (Table 2).   
 
Table 2.  Statistics on Changes in  
Earnings per Share as a Percent of  
Equity Price for Initiating and  
Omitting Firms. 
 
Omissions Initiations 
Year Mean Median Firms Mean Median Firms 
-3 -1.67 0.04 29 19.02 0.84 29 
-2 -.6.0  -1.05 76 49.62 10.43 78 
-1 -7.06 -0.77 76 10.68 5.30 78 
0 -91.8 -47.5 76 2.98 4.45 78 
1 131.6 24.4 76 -16.1 -1.27 78 
2 -19.7 -18.9 76 -4.99 -1.76 78 
3 -17.9 3.53 76 -5.74 -1.20  
 
The mean standardized earnings changes for 
the omission firms for years -3, -2 and -1 are -1.67%, 
-6.0 %, and -7.06 % respectively. The largest 
decrease in mean earnings (-91.8%) occurs in year 0, 
the year of the dividend omission.   However, these 
declines do not persist beyond year 0.  Following 
the dividend omission announcement year, omitting 
firms experienced one year of significant positive 
earnings increases (131.6 %). 
Dividend omissions show negative earnings 
changes for up to three years prior to the dividend 
date and the year of the dividend event; then the 
omission firms’ earnings recover one year afterward.  
This implies that the decision to omit dividends is 
based on the past, current, and future earnings.  
This is consistent with previous findings that 
management is reluctant to cut dividends.  Even 
though Thai firms have faced negative earnings 
changes for three years, the firms still have paid 
dividends.  The firms stop paying dividends when 
they faced extraordinarily negative earnings changes 
(-91.8 %).  This finding is consistent with previous 
research (Healy and Palepu, 1988; DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1990; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006) 
that reports firms that omit dividends experience 
sharp earnings declines. On the other hand, firms 
that initiate dividends have positive earnings changes 
for three years before and the year of the dividend 
event.  Consequently, firms take a while before they 
initiate dividend adjustment. 
Dunnett’s C (Post Hoc) test is a pair-wise 
comparison check when the variances are unequal. It 
was employed to check whether average earnings 
changes wee zero (Table 3).  Earnings changes in 
the omission year (year 0) of dividend omitting firms 
have shown a significant difference from three years 
before (years t-3, t-2, and t-1) and the next one year 
(year 1).  Therefore, Thai firms do not omit 
dividends at the first sign of trouble; they stop 
distributing earnings to shareholders when the 
companies are really financially ill.  There are 
significant earnings increases for at least one year 
after omission announcements which show that the 
omission firms’ earnings recovered.  Therefore, 
dividend omissions seem to provide incremental 
information on a firm’s past, current, and future 
earnings performance.   
 
Table 3 Dunnett’s C Post Hoc Test for Analysis of 
Influence of Past and Future Earnings on Omissions 
  Omission 
Firms 
Initiation  
Firms 
 Associat
ed 
Mean Mean 
Yea
r 
Year Differenc
e 
Differenc
e 
-3 -2 -.03    -.23      
 -1 -.07 .05 
 0 3.09* .19 
 1 -4.11 .45 
 2 .35 .17 
 3 -2.72 .28 
-2 -3 -.04 .23 
 -1 -.02 .28 
 0 3.04* .42 
 1 -4.15 .68* 
 2 .32 .40 
 3 -2.76 .51 
-1 -3 -.06 -.05 
 -2 -.02 -.28 
 0 3.02* .14 
 1 -4.17 .40* 
 2 .3 .13 
 3 -2.8 .23 
0 -3 -3.09* -.19 
 -2 -3.04* -.42 
 -1 -3.02* -.14 
 1 -7.2* .26 
 2 -2.73 -.01 
 3 -5.80 -.09 
1 -3 4.11 -.45 
 -2 4.14 -.68* 
 -1 4.17 -.40* 
 0 7.19* -.26 
 2 4.47 -.28 
 3 1.39 -.17 
2 -3 -.35 -.17 
 -2 -.32 -.40 
 -1 -.29 -.13 
 0 2.73 .01 
 1 -4.47 .28 
 3 -3.08 .11 
3 -3 2.72 -.28 
 -2 2.76 -.51 
 -1 2.78 -.23 
 0 5.8 -.09 
 1 -1.39 .17 
 2 3.08 -.11 
 
 
However, Dunnett’s C test shows that 
current earnings changes for initiating firms are not 
significantly different from the past three years and 
the next three years. The initiating firms have similar 
past, current, and future earnings.  It appears that 
dividend initiations have no information content in 
that firms expect higher earnings for the future. 
2.1 Market Reaction to Earnings 
Announcements after Dividend Omissions 
and Initiations 
Mean abnormal returns for various holding 
periods surrounding the dividend announcements are 
reported in Table 4.   
For the dividend omission firms, the mean 
announcement return is -1.88% and is not 
statistically significant.  These findings indicate 
that investors anticipate omissions from information 
available before the announcement of dividend 
changes.  This is understandable, since most of the 
omissions sample omitted dividends in 1997 which 
was the year that Thailand started to financially 
collapse. The mean announcement return (day 0) for 
the initiation firms is 0.28 %.  These findings 
indicate that dividend initiation decision do not 
appear to be unanticipated good news: no 
statistically significant abnormal returns occur in 
day-1 or in day 0. 
Table 4 Abnormal returns for dividend omitting and 
initiating firms for day -10 to day 10 surrounding the  
Dividend annoucement 
Day Dividend 
Omitting  
firms 
Dividend Initiating 
firms 
Day-10 .61% .54% 
Day-9 -.56% -.08% 
Day-8 .10% -.07% 
Day-7 .78% .15% 
Day-6 .47% -.15% 
Day-5 4.01% -.33% 
Day-4 -10.45% .46% 
Day-3 -23.94% -.35% 
Day-2 -.73% .41% 
Day-1 -.77% .33% 
Day 0 -1.88% .28% 
Day 1 -1.43% -1.02% 
Day 2 .41% .04 % 
Day 3 1.3% .02 % 
Day 4 -24.01% -.28% 
Day 5 .35% -.09% 
Day 6 -.96% -.06% 
Day 7 1.79% -.52% 
Day 8 -1.10%               -.01% 
Day 9 .72% -5.54% 
Day 10 -1.17% -.43% 
 
 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
This research investigated whether changes 
in dividend policy convey information about firms’ 
profitability on the Thai Stock Exchange and studied 
investor reaction to dividend announcements.  A 
sample of 76 firms that omitted dividends for the 
first time or after paying dividends continuously for 
at least three years, and a sample of 78 firms that 
paid dividends for the first time or after a hiatus of at 
least three years, were examined. 
The statistical tests and results presented in 
this study show negative earnings changes for up to 
three years before and the year of the dividend event 
for the omission firms. The decision to omit 
dividends was based on the past, current, and future 
earnings.  Earnings deteriorated during the timing 
of dividend omissions; subsequently, the omission 
firms’ earnings recovered. Therefore, dividend 
omissions seem to provide incremental information 
on a firm’s earnings performance. 
The initiating firms had similar past, current, 
and future earnings.  There was no support for the 
notion that managers consider past and current 
performance as well as expectations of future 
earnings in the dividend initiation decision. The 
current study documents no significant market 
reaction to the announcement of the dividend policy 
changes, indicating that dividend policy can be 
predicted and conveys no new information to 
investors. 
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